

Cayman Monetary Regulatory Authority International

At the forefront of financial regulation, the Cayman Monetary Regulatory Authority International (CMRAI) is dedicated to upholding the highest standards of financial oversight and compliance. Our mission is to safeguard the stability and integrity of the global financial system by ensuring that financial services operate within a framework of transparency, accountability, and excellence.

As a trusted partner to financial institutions worldwide, CMRAI provides rigorous supervision, innovative solutions, and strategic guidance to foster a secure and thriving financial environment. With decades of experience and a commitment to global standards, we stand as a pillar of trust and security in an ever-evolving financial landscape.

With a legacy of excellence in financial oversight, the Cayman Monetary Regulatory Authority International (CMRAI) is a beacon of trust in the international financial community. Our role extends beyond regulation; we are innovators, collaborators, and protectors of the global financial ecosystem. By fostering compliance, promoting best practices, and embracing technological advancements, CMRAI ensures that financial services remain resilient and adaptable in a dynamic global market.

Our comprehensive approach to regulation encompasses a deep understanding of financial risks and a proactive stance on emerging challenges. We are committed to empowering financial institutions with the tools and guidance necessary to navigate complex regulatory landscapes, thereby contributing to global economic stability and growth.

SIX, Cricket Square P.O. Box 10052 Grand

Cayman KY1 1001, Cayman Islands 31 July 2020 NOTICE RE: Financial Sanctions 1. The Cayman Monetary Regulatory Authority International (CMRAI) hereby notifies you that it has received a new Notice from the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation, HM Treasury (OFSI), which is attached as an Annex to this Notice. 2. What you must do: A. In the case of an addition or amendment of a person to the Consolidated List and asset freeze: i. Check whether you maintain any accounts or hold any funds or economic resources for the persons set out in the OFSI Notice; ii. Freeze any such accounts and other funds or economic resources. iii. Refrain from dealing with the funds or assets or making them available (directly or indirectly) to such persons unless licensed by the Governor. iv. Report any findings to the Financial Reporting Authority (FRA) at together with any additional information that would facilitate compliance with the relevant legislative requirements. v. Provide any information concerning the frozen assets of designated persons to the FRA at and submitting a compliance reporting form. Information reported to FRA may be passed to other regulatory authorities or law enforcement. B. In the case of the removal of a person from the Consolidated List and unfreezing of assets i. Check whether you have frozen assets of any person or entity removed from the Consolidated List and verify that the person is no longer subject to an asset freeze. ii. Remove the person from your institution s list of persons or entities subject to financial sanction. iii. Un-freeze the assets of the person and where necessary re-activate all relevant accounts. SIX, Cricket Square P.O. Box 10052 Grand Cayman KY1 1001, Cayman Islands iv. Send advice to the person that the assets are no longer subject to an asset freeze. v. Advise the FRA at of the actions taken. 3. Failure to comply with financial sanctions legislation or to seek to circumvent its provisions is a criminal offence. Further Information. 4. For general information on financial sanctions please see FRAs Industry Guidance on targeted financial sanctions. 21%20FRA%20Financial%20Santions%20Guidance%20(Final).pdf. 5. Enquiries regarding this sanctions notice should be addressed to The Sanctions Coordinator Financial Reporting Authority P.O. Box 1054 Grand Cayman KY1-1102 Cayman Islands REGIME: Cyber-Attacks INDIVIDUAL 1. Names (Last): Gao (1): Qiang (2): n/a (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a Date of Birth: n/a Place of Birth: Shandong Province Nationality: Chinese Passport Details: n/a Address: Room 1102 Guanfu Mansion 46 Xinkai Road Hedong District Tianjin China Other Information Gender: male. Gao Qiang is involved in Operation Cloud Hopper, a series of cyber-attacks. Operation Cloud Hopper targeted information systems of multinational companies in six continents, including companies located in the European Union, and gained unauthorised access to commercially sensitive data, resulting in significant economic loss. The actor publicly known as APT10 (Advanced Persistent Threat 10) (a.k.a. Red Apollo, CVNX, Stone Panda, MenuPass and Potassium) carried out Operation Cloud Hopper. Gao Qiang can be linked to APT10, including through his association with APT10 command and control infrastructure. Moreover, Huaying Haitai, an entity designated for providing support to and facilitating Operation Cloud Hopper, employed Gao Qiang. He has links with Zhang Shilong, who is also designated in connection with Operation Cloud Hopper. Gao Qiang is therefore associated with both Huaying Haitai and Zhang Shilong. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group SIX, Cricket Square P.O. Box 10052 Grand Cayman KY1 1001, Cayman ID: 13903 Islands 2. Names (Last): Zhang (1): Shilong (2): n/a (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a Date of Birth: n/a Place of Birth: n/a Nationality: Chinese Passport Details: n/a Address: Hedong Yuyang Road No 121 Tianjin China Other Information Gender:

male. Zhang Shilong is involved in Operation Cloud Hopper, a series of cyber attacks. Operation Cloud Hopper has targeted information systems of multinational companies in six continents, including companies located in the European Union, and gained unauthorised access to commercially sensitive data, resulting in significant economic loss. The actor publicly known as APT10 (Advanced Persistent Threat 10) (a.k.a. Red Apollo, CVNX, Stone Panda, MenuPass and Potassium) carried out Operation Cloud Hopper. Zhang Shilong can be linked to APT10, including through the malware he developed and tested in connection with the cyber-attacks carried out by APT10. Moreover, Huaying Haitai, an entity designated for providing support to and facilitating Operation Cloud Hopper, employed Zhang Shilong. He has links with Gao Qiang, who is also designated in connection with Operation Cloud Hopper. Zhang Shilong is therefore associated with both Huaying Haitai and Gao Qiang. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13904 Names (Last): Minin (1): Alexey (2): Valeryevich (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a Date of Birth: 27/05/1972 Place of Birth: Perm Oblast Nationality: Russian Passport Details: 120017582. Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Valid from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022 Address: Moscow Russian Federation Other Information Gender: male. Alexey Minin took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands. As a human intelligence support officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Alexey Minin was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW's ongoing investigatory work. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13905 4. Names (Last): Morenets (1): Aleksei (2): Sergeyvich (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a SIX, Cricket Square P.O. Box 10052 Grand Cayman KY1 1001, Cayman Islands Date of Birth: 31/07/1977 Place of Birth: Murmanskaya Oblast Nationality: Russian Passport Details: 100135556. Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Valid from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022 Address: Moscow Russian Federation Other Information Gender: male. Aleksei Morenets took part in an attempted cyber- attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands. As a cyber-operator for the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Aleksei Morenets was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW's ongoing investigatory work. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13906 5. Names (Last): Serebriakov (1): Evgenii (2): Mikhaylovich (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a Date of Birth: 26/07/1981 Place of Birth: Kursk Nationality: Russian Passport Details: 100135555. Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Valid from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022 Address: Moscow Russian Federation Other Information Gender: male. Evgenii Serebriakov took part in an attempted cyber- attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in the Netherlands. As a cyber-operator for the Main Directorate of the

General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Evgenii Serebriakov was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands. in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW's ongoing investigatory work. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13907 6. Names (Last): Sotnikov (1): Oleg (2): Mikhaylovich (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a Date of Birth: 24/08/1972 Place of Birth: Ulyanovsk Nationality: Russian Passport Details: 120018866. Issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation. Valid from 17 April 2017 until 17 April 2022 Address: Moscow Russian Federation SIX, Cricket Square P.O. Box 10052 Grand Cayman KY1 1001, Cayman Islands Other Information Gender: male. Oleg Sotnikov took part in an attempted cyber-attack with a potentially significant effect against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), in the Netherlands. As a human intelligence support officer of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), Oleg Sotnikov was part of a team of four Russian military intelligence officers who attempted to gain unauthorised access to the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW in The Hague, the Netherlands, in April 2018. The attempted cyber-attack was aimed at hacking into the Wi-Fi network of the OPCW, which, if successful, would have compromised the security of the network and the OPCW's ongoing investigatory work. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13908 ENTITY 1. Names (Last): Tianjin Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Co. Ltd (Huaying Haitai) (1): n/a (2): n/a (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a A.K.A: Haitai Technology Development Co. Ltd Other Information Huaying Haitai provided financial, technical or material support for and facilitated Operation Cloud Hopper, a series of cyber-attacks. Operation Cloud Hopper has targeted information systems of multinational companies in six continents, including companies located in the European Union, and gained unauthorised access to commercially sensitive data, resulting in significant economic loss. The actor publicly known as APT10 (Advanced Persistent Threat 10) (a.k.a. Red Apollo, CVNX, Stone Panda, MenuPass and Potassium) carried out Operation Cloud Hopper. Huaving Haitai can be linked to APT10. Moreover, Huaving Haitai employed Gao Qiang and Zhang Shilong, who are both designated in connection with Operation Cloud Hopper. Huaving Haitai is therefore associated with Gao Qiang and Zhang Shilong. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13909 2. Names (Last): Chosun Expo (1): n/a (2): n/a (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a A.K.A: (1) Chosen Expo, (2) Korea Export Joint Venture Other Information Chosun Expo provided financial, technical or material support for and facilitated a series of cyberattacks, including the cyber-attacks publicly known as WannaCry and cyber-attacks against the Polish Financial Supervision Authority and Sony Pictures Entertainment, as well as cyber-theft from the Bangladesh Bank and attempted cyber-theft from the Vietnam Tien Phong Bank. "WannaCry disrupted information systems around the world by targeting information systems with ransomware and blocking access to data. It affected information systems of companies in the European Union, including information systems relating to services necessary for the maintenance of essential services and economic activities within Member States. The actor publicly known as APT38 (Advanced Persistent Threat 38) or the Lazarus Group carried out WannaCry . Chosun Expo can be linked to APT38 / the Lazarus Group, including through the accounts used for the cyber-attacks. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13910 SIX, Cricket Square P.O. Box 10052 Grand Cayman KY1 1001, Cayman Islands 3.

Names (Last): Main Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU) (1): n/a (2): n/a (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a A.K.A: n/a Other Information The Main Centre for Special Technologies (GTsST) of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (GU/GRU), also known by its field post number 74455, is responsible for cyber-attacks, including the cyber-attacks publicly known as NotPetya or EternalPetya in June 2017 and the cyber- attacks directed at an Ukrainian power grid in the winter of 2015 and 2016. NotPetya or EternalPetya rendered data inaccessible in a number of companies in the European Union, wider Europe and worldwide, by targeting computers with ransomware and blocking access to data, resulting amongst others in significant economic loss. The cyber-attack on a Ukrainian power grid resulted in parts of it being switched off during winter. The actor publicly known as Sandworm (a.k.a. Sandworm Team, BlackEnergy Group, Voodoo Bear, Quedagh, Olympic Destroyer and Telebots), which is also behind the attack on the Ukrainian power grid, carried out NotPetya or EternalPetya . The Main Centre for Special Technologies of the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation has an active role in the cyber activities undertaken by Sandworm and can be linked to Sandworm. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: REGIME: The ISIL (Da'esh) and Al-Qaida organisations 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13911 INDIVIDUAL 1. Names (Last): D Ancona (1): Bryan (2): n/a (3): n/a (4): n/a (5): n/a Title: n/a Position: n/a A.K.A: n/a Date of Birth: 26/01/1997 Place of Birth: Nice Nationality: French Passport Details: n/a Address: n/a Other Information EU listing only. Listed On: 31/07/2020 Last Updated: 31/07/2020 Group ID: 13902